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Abstract 
 
This essay examines how the classicist and folklorist Gu Jiegang, in conversation with his Hui 
(Chinese Muslim) colleagues on the Yugong journal (published 1934-1937), theorized the 
“Chinese nation” (Zhonghua minzu) as an internally plural and open-ended political project, to 
resist homogenizing claims made by both Japanese imperialists and the ruling Chinese 
Nationalist party under Chiang Kai-shek in the 1930s.  Echoing the struggles of his Hui 
colleagues to articulate their place in the nation as both Muslim and Chinese, Gu reworks 
traditional “culturalist” assumptions about the non-racial character of identity formation to pose 
minority experience as constitutive of a constantly expanding and transforming political 
community. When Gu claims in his notorious 1939 essay that the “Zhonghua minzu is one,” he 
poses a unity built not on cultural assimilation or ethnic identity, but on a shared political 
commitment to an expansive and culturally hybrid concept of the “Chinese nation.” 
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Can the Chinese Nation Be One?  
Gu Jiegang, Chinese Muslims, and the Reworking of Culturalism 
 
Is it possible to imagine a unified China, without reproducing oppressive and Han-centric 
visions of the nation?  Chinese discourse of the twentieth century is rife with claims that present 
the “false unity of a self-same, national subject evolving through time” along a linear path 
enabling that subject “to realize its destiny in a modern future” (Duara, 1995: 4).  Liang Qichao’s 
germinal work in the 1920s grafted these assumptions onto an existing ethnocentrism when he 
narrated “Chinese” history as the history of a single majority, the Han, whose “assimilative 
power” (tonghua li) was assumed to spontaneously efface meaningful cultural difference among 
the diverse populations that had historically occupied Chinese imperial territories (Liang, 1994; 
Schneider, 2017).  The inherent assimilative power of Chinese civilization has continued to 
support the hierarchical supremacy of a Han-centric Chinese national identity, over and above 
the so-called minority nationalities (shaoshu minzu, or often just minzu) which comprise it.  
Many of the key conceptual frameworks for this national imaginary were first articulated in the 
1930s, when an aggressive Japanese empire sought footholds in Chinese territory in part by 
encouraging separatist movements of minority peoples on the northern frontier (Bodde, 1946; 
Tamanoi, 2000: 253). In response, Chinese intellectuals and policy-makers accelerated and 
expanded existing claims of a strongly unified and homogenous definition of the Chinese nation, 
to buttress both territorial and cultural dominance over its northern and northwestern borders.    
Ironically, amid this intensely political and hyper-nationalist wartime environment, there 
emerged a (still largely overlooked) contribution to the de-centering of Chinese identity. This 
essay examines how the classicist and folklorist Gu Jiegang 顧頡剛 (1893-1980), in 
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conversation with some of his Hui (Chinese Muslim) colleagues on the Yugong journal 
(published 1934-1937), theorized the “Chinese nation” (Zhonghua minzu) as an internally plural, 
open-ended, and emancipatory political project, to resist homogenizing claims made by both 
Japanese imperialists and the ruling Chinese Nationalist party under Chiang Kai-shek in the 
1930s.
1
  Gu and his colleagues would agree with many modern scholars who narrate China’s past 
in terms of mutual accommodation and porous boundaries between diverse cultural groups that 
changed over time and space (Gladney, 1994; Mullaney et al., 2012)—what Pamela Crossley has 
called a “totality of convergently and divergently related localisms” (Crossley, 1990: 15). Yet 
Gu’s vision is distinctive in attempting to balance the tensions of inclusion and particularity. Gu 
argues that only unity will secure the territorial and national integrity required to fight Japanese 
imperial incursions, but importantly—nearly alone among his Han contemporaries—he goes on 
to ask how such unity can be achieved without reproducing the historical and structural 
oppressions that continue to marginalize non-Han peoples in Chinese lands.  Echoing the 
struggles of his Hui colleagues to articulate their place in the nation as both Muslim and Chinese, 
Gu’s concept of the Zhonghua minzu poses minority experience and cultures as constitutive of a 
constantly expanding and transforming community, bound by shared consciousness and 
commitment to political goals rather than unified by racial or cultural similarity.  
One of the most unexpected and innovative features of Gu’s work in this period was his 
creative re-deployment of the “culturalist” premise behind claims to China’s assimilative power, 
namely the belief that anyone of any racial, cultural, or ethnic background (in Chinese terms, “all 
under Heaven,” tianxia) would become Sinified (Hanhua, lai hua) through participation in 
Chinese culture (wen)—typically meaning the institutions and rituals of specifically Han 
civilization (Ho, 1998; Langlois, 1980).
2
 Nationalist ideology of the Nanjing Decade famously 
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built on such claims to argue for national homogeneity and the inevitable assimilation of non-
Han peoples into the Han majority. Gu’s innovation is to empty such claims of their specific 
ethnocentric features, while retaining their emphasis on deliberate participation in shared 
practices—rather than patrilineal bloodline descent—as the key criterion for membership in any 
minzu.
3
 Drawing on his own experience travelling through the Chinese northwestern frontier, Gu 
eventually specifies this form of membership as affiliation with particular “teachings” (jiao), 
which may or may not have any relationship to one’s presumed cultural or racial background.  
Jiao-affiliation thus enables overlapping identities, allowing for the possibility of radical self-
transformation from one “teaching” to another—all while co-existing within the larger domain of 
the “Chinese nation,” the Zhonghua minzu.   
Gu’s nationalist project thus introduces ambivalence into the designation of clearly-
bordered minzu even as it explores the necessary relationship of China’s internal diversity to 
projects of political unification. However, perhaps because of his support for national unity over 
separatist movements, Gu has been criticized for endorsing problematic assumptions of Chinese 
superiority vis-à-vis “barbarian” others, upholding some notion of a singular albeit dynamic 
Chinese essence, or sublimating recurrent ethno-cultural difference in the name of a unified 
Chinese national subject (Leibold, 2003: 466, 2006: 211; Lipman, 2002).  Chinese scholars, in 
particular, have argued that Gu promoted an inaccurate vision of a culturally monolithic China as 
a wartime exigency, contradicting his earlier commitments to an objective and scientific 
historiography that produced more nuanced and diverse pictures of the Chinese past (Ge, 2015; 
Yu, 2007). Recent debates over reforming China’s current Soviet-inspired ethnic policy have 
favorably invoked Gu as an advocate of the “depoliticization” of ethnic identity (Rong Ma 馬戎, 
 7 
2012; Zhou and Zhang, 2007), implying that his arguments from the 1930s entail state 
centralization of a fully assimilated national population (Elliott, 2015).   
I argue here that a more careful reading of Gu’s work in the 1930s, in tandem with that of 
his Hui colleagues, decenters and problematizes China’s importance: it poses the nation as a 
contingent and plural political signifier, rather than an enduring racial, ethnic or cultural one.
4
 
When Gu claims in his notorious 1939 essay that the “Zhonghua minzu is one,” he poses a unity 
built not on cultural assimilation or ethnic identity, but on a shared political commitment to an 
expansive and culturally hybrid concept of the “Chinese nation.” This theorization attempts to 
transform the “Chinese nation” from a homogenizing and oppressive concept to an emancipatory 
one—with the potential to liberate Chinese people not only from the threat of Japanese 
imperialism, but also from parochial and monolithic views of Chinese national identity. 
 
Arguing about Culture in 1930s China 
Debates about Chinese identity and nationalism long preceded the establishment of 
Chiang’s Nanjing-based Nationalist Party regime in 1927. However, it was during this period, 
until the collapse of the Second United Front between the KMT and Chinese communists in 
1940, that these issues took on acute and specific political significance. This so-called “Nanjing 
Decade” marked the first time in more than thirty years that China’s former imperial territory 
was united under one government. The Nationalist unification project gave rise to unprecedented 
discussions about the nature and composition of “China” as a national entity, focused in 
particular on the relationship between the dominant Han Chinese majority (comprising about 
80% of the population) and the diverse populations of non-Han groups—some but not all of 
which drew self-identity from their explicit demarcation as constituencies under the overthrown 
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dynasty, the Manchu-ruled Qing (Lipman, 2002: 114).5  Attempts to write “cultural history” in 
the late 1920s began to explore the contribution of non-Han peoples to the Chinese past, by 
replacing a racialized Chinese subject of history with a cultural one (Hon, 2004; Schneider, 2014: 
93). But by the early 1930s, these explorations were superseded by an increasingly Han-centric, 
homogenous vision of the “Chinese nation” (Zhonghua minzu) derived from Sun Yatsen’s 
germinal declaration of his “three principles of the people,” first published in the 1906 manifesto 
for his anti-Qing revolutionary organization the Tongmenghui (Sun, 1927). 
One of Sun’s three principles, minzu (“nationality” or “nationalism”) seemed to extend 
the promise of national self-determination to all oppressed peoples. However, both modern 
scholars and contemporary writers have argued that the minzu promoted by Sun was a term used 
to reinforce the traditional dominance of Chinese civilization over its neighboring states (Qi, 
1937: 27–28). According to James Leibold, Sun’s minzu concept marshalled the rhetoric of 
modern science and theories of development to consolidate national consciousness in the face of 
Japanese and European imperialism, while denying self-determination to minority groups within 
China’s borders.  To Sun, these peripheral peoples “were ethnic relics destined for eventual 
assimilation with a superior ‘Han Chinese’ majority via the dispassionate ‘scientific law’ of 
natural selection’”(Leibold, 2004: 165).  Even as the frontier regions, inhabited by a variety of 
cultural groups that in some places outnumbered Han, grew strategically more important in the 
wake of the 1931 Manchurian Bridge incident, Chiang’s regime appropriated Sun’s rhetoric to 
promote a unified vision of Chinese identity that was homogenous not only culturally but also 
racially. Applying Sun’s ideas to Nationalist party ideology, Chiang and his ideologues such as 
Dai Jitao identified the Zhonghua minzu with direct bloodline descent from the mythical Yellow 
Emperor. These ideas revived a discourse on race articulated in the late nineteenth century most 
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famously by Zhang Taiyan, who linked concepts of “race” to the indigenous practice of posing 
kinship ties among different lineages or clans with the same surname (Kai-wing Chow, 1997: 48).  
For Chiang, a shared racial lineage eventually converged into a homogenous cultural heritage. 
As he would eventually put it in his 1943 tract China’s Destiny, a book widely circulated as 
“extracurricular material” for China’s schools and universities, including the Central Political 
Training Institute : 
 
According to its historic development, our Chinese nation was formed by the blending of 
numerous clans. These clans were originally branches of the same race, spreading to the 
east of the Pamir plateau, along the valleys of the Yellow, the Huai, the Yangtze, the 
Heilungkiang, and the Pearl rivers. They maintained different cultures according to the 
differences in their geographical environment. And cultural differences gave rise to 
differences among the clans. However, during the past five thousand years, with 
increasing contacts and migrations, they have been continuously blended into a nation. 
But the motive power of that blending was cultural rather than military, and the method 
of blending was by assimilation rather than by conquest…. 
Within the Four Seas, the clans of the various localities were either descendants of 
a common ancestor or were interrelated through marriage. The Book of Odes states: “The 
descendants of Wen Wang extend to hundreds of generations, but all come from the same 
family tree.” This means that the main and branch stocks all belong to the same blood 
stream (Chiang, 1947: 30–31).  
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Chiang extended this identity narrative to justify inclusion of frontier areas within Chinese 
national territory, both by denying the racial distinctiveness of minority groups on those areas 
and by deploying a traditional rhetoric of Chinese cultural dominance. This rhetoric, employed 
as well by intellectuals such as Liu Yizheng who resisted race-based identity claims (Hon, 2003: 
265–6; Kuo, 2014: 285), held that it was through cultural assimilation of foreign others that the 
Chinese state extended its boundaries. Indeed, Chiang argues that cultural homogeneity 
determined the geographic as well as military limits of the state, now and in the past: “the 
territory of the Chinese state is determined by the requirements for national survival and by the 
limits of Chinese cultural bonds. Thus, in the territory of China a hundred years ago, comprising 
more than ten million square kilometers, there was not a single district that was not essential to 
the survival of the Chinese nation, and none that was not permeated by our culture”(Chiang, 
1947: 34). 
These ideological narratives of a homogenous Chinese descent and singular unified 
culture were further promoted by co-opted academic elites such as Fu Sinian, the influential 
historian and recently appointed leader of the Institute for History and Philology at China’s 
national academy of sciences, Academia Sinica.  Motivated by patriotic fervor and a need to 
invigorate opposition to Japanese imperialism after Japanese forces took Mukden in northern 
China, Fu encouraged his fellow academics to write and research national histories that promoted 
KMT readings of the past, while promoting his own vision of a homogenous, timeless national 
history that stretched both backward and forward in time (Fu, 1980b).  In a 1935 essay, “The 
Chinese nation [Zhonghua minzu] is a totality,” Fu advances a sweeping claim about the timeless 
and perpetual unity of the Chinese people for the past two millennia:  
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From the rise of the Qin and Han onward 2000 years to now, sometimes because of 
barbarian invasion, the north and south were separated, and sometimes because of the 
separatism of unscrupulous schemers, the country has been split up. However, these are 
facts forced by human power, not facts of nature. Once there is an appropriate leader in 
place, everything immediately becomes united as one family. From the desert regions of 
the North, to Hainan Island and Jiaozhi6 in the South; from the quicksands of the West to 
Jilin and Xuantu7 in the East—these are all lands naturally given to us, the Chinese nation 
[Zhonghua minzu]. We Chinese [women Zhonghua minzu] speak with one language, 
write with one script, and practice the same kind of ethics according to one and the same 
culture. We are just as one single clan [jiazu]. We also rely on the minority nationalities 
[shaoshu minzu] within this nation, but we Chinese since ancient times have had a kind of 
attractive virtue, in that we do not discriminate against the partial views of small 
nationalities, while maintaining the bearing of a single family from sea to sea (Fu, 1980b: 
1724–5). 
 
Fu characterizes the “Chinese nation” here as a grand and special kind of nationality, whose 
culture inevitably attracts and assimilates the “small nationalities” in its geographic orbit, 
dissolving their cultural and racial distinctiveness (as well as their territories) into a single 
Chinese national culture. These ideas motivate Fu’s other work during this period, including the 
Outline History of Northeastern China that he wrote for the Lytton Commission. Attempting to 
rebut Japanese claims that Manchuria (along with Mongolia and Tibet) were not parts of Chinese 
territory, Fu’s hastily written report claimed erroneously that the Chinese northeastern territories 
had been governed by Chinese bureaucratic system since the beginning of recorded history, and 
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that Manchuria and Korea historically had maintained only minimal communication with Japan 
(League of Nations et al., 1932; Leibold, 2006: 189; Wang, 2000: 149–151).  
The uncharacteristically careless presentation of historical realities, by an established 
scholar well-known for promoting rigorous standards of objective historical scholarship, met 
with great criticism from contemporaries, but offers great insight into the pressure felt by many 
scholars to defend Chinese territorial claims in the name of nationalism.  Indeed, such work was 
amplified by an ongoing academic debate about the nature of “Chineseness” in light of the 
adoption of Western technology, medicine, social institutions and political ideas that had begun 
in the late nineteenth century. Calls to “construct culture on a Chinese base” (jianshe Zhongguo 
benwei de wenhua) were advanced by a number of academics including the editor of the 
influential Shanghai Commercial Press, Wang Xinming, and which in turn has been linked to the 
KMT government’s “Committee on Cultural Construction” headed by Chen Lifu, member of one 
of two KMT secret police organizations (Wang et al., 1990; Zheng, 2004). A 1935 declaration, 
and several years of debate in popular media, reinforced essentialized notions of Chinese identity 
by claiming distinctive national characteristics (teshuxing) that could exist independently of 
foreign influence (Jenco, 2016). 
Amid these pervasive, politically-supported claims to national homogeneity, some 
intellectuals began elaborating a counter-narrative of Chinese identity, rooting it in growing 
historical evidence of China’s culturally and racially diverse past.  Taking the unofficial lead on 
this counter-movement was the classicist Gu Jiegang, Fu’s former Beijing University roommate 
who is best known for his painstaking text-critical analyses and editorial work on the iconoclastic 
series Debates on Ancient History (Gushi bian). These projects of “doubting antiquity” (yigu) 
and “reorganizing the national heritage” (zhengli guogu) critically interrogated the traditional 
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celebratory narratives of China’s ancient past using modern historiographical techniques and 
archeology, enabling what its producers believed to be a more objectively verifiable, “scientific” 
account of Chinese civilization for the purposes of national renewal (Gu, 1926; Wang Fansen, 
1987). Although executed with a spirit of academic professionalism self-consciously detached 
from political concerns, Gu’s historical work in the early 1930s took explicit issue with KMT 
claims to a single unified Chinese identity based on homogenous bloodline descent (Chin, 2012: 
134; Hon, 1996).
8
   
In his essay “On the Origins of the Qin-Han Unification and the Global Imaginary of 
People of the Warring States Period,” published in 1930 in the second volume of Gushi bian, Gu 
argued, contra KMT ideology, that there exists no historical evidence for a unitary Chinese or 
Han minzu stretching back in time to before the Qin unification in 221 BCE. 
 
We have long had a misunderstanding in thinking that the eighteen provinces inhabited 
by the Han people (Han zu) have been unified since ancient times. This mistakenly uses a 
point of view from after the Qin and Han to determine the borders before the Qin and 
Han. In this speech, I want to explain this idea, namely: China before the Qin and Han 
was simply a scattering of small states that were not unified; and only after small states 
turned into big states did there arise a determination to unify [them]; and only under this 
determination to unify [them], did there exist the Qin Emperor’s efforts to create forty 
commanderies (Gu, 1930: 1).  
 
This essay, and its claims about the irreducibly plural and fragmented nature of historical 
Chinese identity, represents the intersection of Gu’s classicism with the ethnographic work that 
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would come to preoccupy him throughout the 1930s.
9
 In this essay, Gu is careful to show that 
not only was early China not united, there also existed no such “world concept” or “global 
imaginary” (shijie guannian) in pre-Qin China that could realistically be said to express any such 
justification or understanding of unification.  This concept did not develop even incipiently, Gu 
argues, until the end of the Warring States period around the third century BCE.  
This was another way of saying that the “China” claimed by the KMT government to 
have existed in the same way throughout time was in fact the object of multiple names, contained 
within expanding and contracting borders at different historical periods, and inhabited by 
different kinds of people. In Gu’s eyes, to claim, as the KMT government did, that the borders of 
the Xia, Shang and Zhou dynasties were identical to those of the Warring States, and in turn 
identical to those of present-day China, “is a total joke,” propagated to falsely erase minzu-based 
differences for the ends of national unity (Gu, 1930: 4–5). What’s more, Gu argues, there is 
compelling evidence to suggest that even the vaunted Zhou dynasty—whose cultural splendor 
and political prosperity made it the subject of Confucian veneration for nearly two millennia—
was founded in Shanxi by a race derived from the so-called “barbarian” Di and Qiang peoples 
(Gu, 1930: 2).  In writing about the changing “world concepts” found in ancient states associated 
with the birth of the Chinese people, Gu throws critical historical light on contemporary 
discussions about the present-day unification of China. 
Most recent historical commentators have interpreted Gu’s stance on the status of 
minority cultures as an importantly iconoclastic counter-narrative to simple claims of national 
homogeneity, but nevertheless one which upholds the inherent superiority of Han-based Chinese 
culture. Gu’s biographer Laurence Schneider maintains that Gu valued non-Chinese peoples and 
cultures instrumentally for their ability to rejuvenate the periodically moribund dominant culture, 
 15 
enabling it to continue and persist (Schneider, 1971: 263). James Leibold insists that Gu’s 
narrative remained “firmly within the linear teleology of a Han-dominated Chinese nation, 
projecting both forward and backward through time a single national subject: the Zhonghua 
minzu” (Leibold, 2006: 211). Recent work by Thomas Mullaney builds from these prior 
characterizations to deem the work of Gu and his colleagues influenced by May Fourth discourse 
as suffused with “an exoticizing and paternalistic sentiment” in regards to minority and frontier 
peoples (Mullaney, 2011: 56).  
These readings associate Gu with the same ethnocentric logic of “culturalism” 
propagated by Chiang Kai-shek and Fu Sinian: that is, the belief that Chinese culture irresistibly 
and inevitably attracts and assimilates the peoples of lesser cultures, resulting in the persistence 
of Han political and cultural authority over increasingly broad neighboring territories. These 
interpretations of Gu find some support in his 1930 essay, where he mentions the cultural power 
of the people in the state of Wei assimilating groups with less advanced cultures (Gu, 1930: 3).  
In his Autobiography, published as a preface to the first edition of the Gushi bian in 1927, he 
also states that “Had it not been for the infusion of new blood from the Five Barbarian groups 
(wu hu) of the Chin [Qin] dynasty, from the Khitan, from the Jürched and Mongols, I fear that 
the Han race could not have survived” (Gu and Hummel, 1931: 166). 
Such claims that the “Han race” required infusions from foreign others for its vitality and 
survival had become part of nearly unquestioned common sense by the 1920s, both for Chinese 
reformers as well as for Western academics in the emerging fields of demography and 
anthropology. As early as 1895 Liang Qichao and Yan Fu were calling for the use of education 
in foreign ideas to invigorate a Chinese people about to winnowed out of the race for 
evolutionary success (e.g., Yan Fu, 1985).  Gu is somewhat distinctive, however, in pointing out 
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here the value to Chinese survival, not only of the Western foreign elements that formed the 
backbone of most reformist thought since the late nineteenth century, but also of the historical 
influxes of non-Han cultural groups that generated vitality during waning periods of the Chinese 
empire.   
Of course, Gu is not the first to point out that Chinese culture historically benefited from 
(and was transformed by) its interaction with non-Chinese groups. His contemporary Liu 
Yizheng and others associated with the journal Cultural Review (Xueheng) attempted to show 
that precisely because “China” changed over time as it came into contact with foreign others, it 
was best understood as a cultural entity rather than a racial identity (Hon, 2004: 520). Yet for 
Liu and others persuaded by his much-reprinted History of Chinese Culture (Liu, 1932), there 
existed beneath these transformations an enduring “national character” (guomin xing), which 
formed the subject of that history and “whose genesis in antiquity defined the founding moment 
of the nation” (Kuo, 2014: 284). In contrast, recognizing how thoroughly Chinese culture was 
invigorated, and at certain points reconstituted, by “foreign” elements, Gu began to question both 
the character and the historical stability of that national subject. His work during the 1930s on 
the historical and human geography of the frontier eventually culminates in  a definition of “the 
Chinese nation” (Zhonghua minzu) as a political association rather than one comprised of a 
monolithic culture, race or ethnicity.
10
 In doing so, he divests claims about Chinese nationality 
from the historical ethnocentrism of “culturalist” arguments such as those of Liu Yizheng and 
Chiang Kai-shek, while simultaneously transposing the theory of non-racial, affect-based forms 
of membership onto the term minzu.  
 
“The Chinese Nation is One” 
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Gu’s clearest and most direct arguments about the nature of the Chinese minzu, including 
its relationship to the various groups within it (which he also, somewhat confusingly, also calls 
minzu), are found in a series of essays he wrote in the mid- to late 1930s, in response to 
mounting pressure from the political regime as well as politically co-opted friends and 
colleagues, including Fu Sinian. Fu, in collusion with KMT political leaders, repeatedly and at 
length urged Gu to abandon his attention to the frontier question and his insistence on the plural 
origins of Chinese civilization (Fu, 1980a). Both interests, Fu believed, encouraged sympathy for 
ethnic minorities at the expense of national unity (Leibold, 2003: 484–5).  Recognizing the 
imminent threat of Japanese invasion and national fragmentation, Gu’s basic response to this 
conundrum is to claim that “the Chinese nation is one” (Zhonghua minzu shi yi ge de), a phrase 
that also serves as the name of his hugely controversial 1939 essay published in the monthly 
“Frontier” supplement of the Yishibao. The summary appended to the beginning of the essay 
explains Gu’s point as “the Chinese people (Zhongguo ren) are all Zhonghua minzu”(Gu, 2010d: 
94).
11
  The essay goes on to explain, however, that such national unity can be properly achieved 
only through deeper understanding of the diverse forms of life, including minority minzu cultures, 
that in actuality comprised that nation.  
Key to his argument is his historical research on the blending of races and cultures in 
ancient China, and the continuation of such interaction under the empire. To Gu, these processes 
of interaction effaced racial consciousness in China, while simultaneously producing a 
distinctive mode of group affiliation in which people continuously abandoned certain ways of 
life to take up more favorable alternatives (Gu, 2010d: 97). Such choices constantly refigured 
group identity in ways that challenged prevalent assumptions that cultural and minzu identity 
necessarily overlap.  In a passage perhaps deliberately reminiscent of Chiang Kai-shek’s claims 
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to Chinese territorial expansion through cultural assimilation, Gu argues that historically Chinese 
shared identity was built solely on political rather than racial or cultural unification:   
 
We had never had racial prejudices; one had only to live within the borders of China and 
accept a governmental authority to become mutually confirmed as a citizen (renmin) in 
one equal body.  
Above I have already made clear that the Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu) is not 
organized by bloodlines. Now I want to go a step further, and say that the Chinese nation 
is not even built upon the same culture. I already spoke about Confucius not wanting to 
unbind his hair and fold his robe from the left, [an incident] which seemed to indicate that 
that old gentleman loathed barbarian culture.
12
 But actually that is not the case; he was 
merely hoping that people could have a better life, not that people had to live life a 
certain way. Today the culture of the Han people, everyone says, seems to continue the 
culture of the Shang and Zhou [dynasties]. But actually this is not correct; from early on 
it selected the good points and abandoned the bad points of every kind of race and 
nationality to become a kind of hybrid (zonghe) culture (Gu, 2010d: 96). 
 
Although there remain here assumptions about the natural superiority of Han culture—such as 
that it alone seems to have integrated the self-evidently “best” aspects of foreign cultures to 
create its own extraordinary civilization—Gu nevertheless shows here how a theory of Zhonghua 
minzu can be opened to the possibility that other people can legitimately live differently. First, he 
glosses a passage from the Analects, typically interpreted as dismissive of foreign culture, in 
terms that suggest other cultures worthy of emulation do exist alongside Chinese civilization 
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(Miyakawa, 1960: 24–26).  Second, more revealingly, he implies that other cultures must be free 
to develop on their own terms if they are to spread their influence to others. This is particularly 
because Gu emphasizes the ongoing dynamism of this “hybridity” or blending. In so far as such 
historical blending took place, Gu argues, its result cannot legitimately be called “Han culture” 
or a “Han” nation anymore; it is now a “Chinese national culture” (Zhonghua minzu de wenhua) 
because “we are just people who live a shared life together under the same government and we 
ought not to have another name outside of Zhonghua minzu” (Gu, 2010d: 98).13 Living as co-
equals under a single government, Gu urges the abandonment of terms such as “China proper” 
(Zhongguo benbu) or the “Republic of Five Ethnicities” which divide peoples living on the 
peripheries from the predominant Han populations in eastern China, and diminish their 
commitment to national projects meant to include them (Gu, 2010d). 
Gu’s claims here draw heavily on his ongoing personal and professional engagement with 
members of the very minority groups the Nationalist narrative marginalized: specifically, the Hui 
(Chinese Muslim) people who inhabited the strategically important northern frontiers as well as 
many of China’s major cities. Gu himself admitted that he became interested in Chinese Muslims 
only when Japan’s incursions on the mainland forced greater attention to the importance of the 
border regions (Gu, 1937b: 187). But from that point forward, the Hui would become both a 
source and site of his thinking about the constitution of the Zhonghua minzu and the scope of its 
inclusion. His work with the Hui extended beyond academic research to personal and 
professional relationships, including the establishment of scholarly networking and publication 
outlets to give voice to young Hui activists and scholars. His activities with the Borderland 
Research Society in Beijing exposed him to increasing numbers of local Chinese Muslims, such 
as those associated with Chengda Normal College, as well as representatives from Egypt’s al-
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Azhar University (Mao Yufeng, 2011; Schneider, 1971: 286–7).   In 1937 Gu accepted an 
invitation from the Boxer Educational Commission to travel to the Northwest, to explore 
firsthand the Muslim communities targeted by Japanese propaganda. Setting out for Lanzhou in 
September of that year, Gu’s journey took him Qinghai to meet with the Muslim provincial 
officials General Ma Bufang and Ma Lin (Gu, 2010b). When the Japanese began bombing 
Lanzhou, Gu accepted yet another invitation to join National Yunnan University in the south 
(also an area with concentrated minority populations). There he continued his investigation of 
Muslim education until 1940, when he resumed normal teaching at the relocated Jilu University 
in Chengdu (Schneider, 1971: 290–1, 294).  
By this point the Japanese invasion had forced relocation of the Chinese capital from 
Beijing in the northeast to Chongqing in the western interior, where most universities and other 
social institutions had already relocated at the outbreak of hostilities. Gu himself, as the editor of 
an anti-Japanese vernacular journal called Popular Readings (Tongsu duwu) and founder of an 
anti-Japanese propaganda organization, found himself on the Most Wanted list of the Japanese 
Guandong army and fled to Suiyuan (Liu, 2014: 192; Schneider, 1971: 280, 285). 
Anthropologists, sociologists and historians such as Gu found themselves situated now within 
the historical territories of the very ethno-cultural groups KMT policy hoped to integrate, 
offering unprecedented opportunities for their first-hand study as a means of solving the by-now 
boiling hot question of national unity: were these groups culturally distinct, politically 
autonomous communities deserving of their own territorial self-determination, as many Chinese 
communist party (CCP) members believed, or would recognizing these groups as distinct 
communities fracture Chinese territory and leave the entire country vulnerable to further 
Japanese infiltration and invasion, as the KMT insisted? (Mullaney, 2011: 61)  These questions 
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were, obviously, more than academic: Japan had invaded Manchuria in 1931 on the pretense that 
Chinese authorities denied self-determination to the minority groups inhabiting its northern 
frontiers (Ando, 2003; Bodde, 1946).  
By that point, under pressure from colleagues (including his love interest Tan Muyu, who 
accompanied KMT operatives to Suiyuan to begin investigating what was called “the border 
issue”), Gu’s scrupulous scholarly isolation from politics had completely broken down (Chan, 
2016: 173–176).  Some contemporary and modern commentators tend to see Gu’s political 
activism in this period, centered around his arguments about the unity of the Zhonghua minzu, as 
constituting a sharp break with his iconoclastic studies of China’s ancient past in Gushibian (Ge, 
2015; Qian, 1998: 171; discussed in Chan 2016, 165-6 et passim; Yu, 2007). Although his work 
did become more presentist, in that his research topics were chosen on the basis of present needs 
rather than the purely intellectual goals of historicism, Gu’s scholarly activities in the 1930s can 
be interpreted as advancing the same “re-organization of the national heritage” (zhengli guogu) 
that originally guided his work on Gushibian.
14
 As I explain in what follows, those scholarly 
interests increasingly dovetailed with political movements to expand the scope of the “national 
heritage” to include research on the identity-formation and ongoing presence of Hui Muslim and 
other minority groups in historical Chinese territory—a point also noted by Hui contributors to 
the Yugong (Jin, 1937: 182).
15
  
Such research, and the historical examples of cultural interaction that it unearthed, 
enabled Gu to imagine a third way of understanding the Zhonghua minzu, beyond both the 
homogenizing racial identity narratives of the KMT and the fragmentation of China by Japanese 
imperial interests: groups such as the Hui could be recognized both as distinctive minzu 
(“nationalities”) and as part of a politically unified Zhonghua minzu (the “Chinese nation”). The 
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concrete implications of that third way become manifest in Gu’s work on the Yugong journal 
with Chinese Muslim writers, who used expanding publication opportunities to explore their 
relationship both to their supposed minzu affiliation, as well as to the Chinese state.  Gu’s work 
with Hui intellectuals offers both a case study, and further theorization, of how Gu could 
simultaneously argue both that distinctive minzu identities were important and worthy of 
particular historical, cultural and political recognition, while also maintaining that the Chinese 
nation which subsumed them was itself a unity.   
 
The Han-Hui Question 
Gu’s most significant contribution to the debates over a Chinese Muslim identity 
arguably lies in his co-founding of the Yugong semi-monthly scholarly journal in 1934, which 
until its wartime demise in 1937 offered increasingly broad coverage of contemporary minzu 
debates in addition to more academic pieces on historical geography.16  Gu identified the Yugong 
as the upper-class literate counterpart to his widely circulating vernacular Popular Readings 
series: both were central to promoting a new vision of the nation during the war with Japan (Liu, 
2014: 194). The content of this journal—including but not limited to Gu’s personal 
contributions—is therefore significant for understanding Gu’s perspective on the nation.   
Hui intellectuals were a core set of contributors (and central topic of discussion) for the 
Yugong, for several reasons.  Unlike other Muslim groups in China such as the Turkic-speaking 
Uighurs, most Hui did not pose resistance to inclusion within the Chinese nation and exhibited 
many outwardly Chinese traits.  They were dispersed across every province and urban center in 
China, where often only their Muslim religious and dietary practices distinguished them from 
their Han neighbors. These “familiar strangers” (to use Jonathan Lipman’s term) had passed 
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examinations for public service under the former empire and loyally served emperors since the 
Ming dynasty (Lipman, 1998).  In addition, Hui elites had long mastered the Chinese classical 
language (wenyan) of official discourse, and continued to use it even after Chinese reformers 
abandoned it for the vernacular in the 1920s (Aubin, 2006: 262).  In fact, letters and articles 
published in Yugong by Muslim scholars and activists show that the Hui very much saw 
themselves as part of the Chinese nation—albeit not always on the terms extended to them (Bai, 
2010; e.g., Jin, 1936). The ambivalence of this relationship led Japanese propagandists to exploit 
Hui dissatisfaction with Qing and Republican Chinese rule, including the creation of an anti-
Chinese Muslim league in the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932 (Benite, 2004: 98; 
Bodde, 1946). But it also led many Muslim scholars to explore creatively the nature of their 
inclusion in the Chinese state.  
This “Hui-Han question” formed the core of a special supplement to the Yugong in 1937, 
spearheaded by a reprint of Gu’s essay “Hui Han wenti he muqian yingyou de gongzuo” (The 
Hui-Han question and the work we ought to be doing right now”) with responses and original 
essays from a number of Hui scholars.  These discussions continued work begun by Hui 
intellectuals more than three decades earlier, when they debated the nature of their inclusion in 
the Chinese state in such publications as Xinghui pian (Awakening Islam) and Yisilan (Islam) 
(Aubin, 2006: 252; Yang and Yu, 1992). The wartime exigencies of the 1930s had provoked 
attacks on Islam and Muslim customs, inflaming existing prejudice (and even violence) against 
these presumably cultural outsiders to the Chinese nation (Cieciura, 2016: 127). In the Yugong, 
as well as other like-minded publications including Chengda University’s appropriately named 
Yuehua (Crescent China), Hui intellectuals pursued two basic arguments in response. The first 
argument sought to deepen the critique of minzu by recognizing it as a contingent rather than 
 24 
natural signifier, thereby troubling its identification with a homogenous cultural, religious, or 
ethnic community. The second interrogated the specific relationship of Muslims to a nation-state 
in which they did not form the majority. Both of these projects shared a similar goal: to establish 
the terms under which the Hui could be seen not as merely assimilated, Sinified Muslims, but 
rather as a group constituted by distinct experiences and practices that themselves should 
contribute to a broader understanding of Zhonghua minzu. 
The first argument is typified by Wang Riwei’s discussion of the distinction between the 
Hui as an nationality or people (zu) and as a religion (jiao), published in Yugong in August 1936. 
Advancing a detailed historical argument that made systematic use of Chinese records including 
dynastic histories, Wang argued that the term Hui, often used interchangeably to refer both to 
Chinese Muslims as well as to Islam as a religion, originated as a term for a people (zu) whose 
association with Islam came only much later (Wang, 1936: 41–42).  As late as Song times, he 
argued, “Huihui” described not only Uyghurs in Gaochang and Beiting, but also the peoples of 
the Pamir high plateau; in the Yuan, terms such as “Hui” referred indiscriminately to the 
“persons of various categories” (semu ren) of western China (Wang, 1936: 44). Only with Sun 
Yat-sen’s introduction of the “Five Race Republic,” Wang argues, were the language, clothing, 
and practices of the so-called “Hui nationality” standardized to suit Sun’s definition of a minzu. 
Wang’s work dovetailed with that of Tong Shuye and others publishing in the Yugong that 
interrogated the relationship between categories such as Xia (“Chinese”) and the contemporary 
groups of people they named (Tong, 1934).  
These historical analyses showed decisively that both Muslims and the Hui—whether 
those categories were overlapping or not—had nearly always been a part of what was considered 
China. But these arguments did more than simply upend narratives of national homogeneity; they 
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also supported an already emergent theoretical insight about the nature of minzu that would go 
on to play a major role in Gu’s work.  By offering persuasive and systematic historical evidence 
of how variably markers such as “Hui” and “Chinese” were applied to particular groups across 
time, these arguments demonstrated the degree to which terms such as minzu did not mark 
naturally-occuring, pre-existing groupings of people. Rather, minzu was a deliberately 
constructed and contextualized category that could be politically imposed by national authorities 
on minority groups, but also resisted and refigured by the actions of their members. The borders 
and members of any given minzu were therefore contingent and subject to political 
transformation, a point made by Bai Shouyi白壽彝 (1909-2000) in his response to Gu’s article 
on the “Han-Hui question.” According to Bai and other contributors, perceptions of Hui people 
and of Islam more generally in China come from the polarizing categories imposed by the Qing 
rulers, which themselves did not reflect reality (Bai, 1937: 187; Da, 1937). As Jin Jitang 金吉堂
(1908-1978) notes, being a Muslim did not make one Hui, because there were other Muslim 
groups in China who were not perceived as Hui; yet the claim that there existed a single 
bloodline that could determine Hui-ness was also untenable, precisely because Hui claimed so 
many different lands of origin (Jin, 1936: 29). 
For some Hui intellectuals, including Bai, this realization about the flexibility of minzu 
categories and their detachment from bloodline lineages (including race) made possible 
arguments for the present and future inclusion of the Hui as loyal members of the Chinese nation 
(Bai, 1937: 186), rather than as permanent “sojourners” (qiaomin) whose loyalties lie in their 
presumed homelands (zuguo) in Turkey, Egypt, and places west (Liu, 1929: 60).  Imam Wang 
Jingzhai, writing about Hui patriotism in Yuehua in 1930, elaborates the principles of this loyalty 
using the Arabic term watan, or “homeland,” which he roughly translates as “the place where 
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people have political power and responsibility” (Wang, 1930: 1).  Citing an alleged Quranic 
hadith, “hubb al-watan min al-īmān” (“love of the watan is an article of faith”), Wang argues 
decisively that Chinese Muslims should support the guojia (“state”) of which they are a part 
(Huang, 2012: 79–80; for discussion of Wang’s use of Quranic hadith here, see Matsumoto, 
2006: 128; Wang, 1930). In an essay that reveals much about the interpenetration of Chinese and 
Muslim thought, Wang’s colleague at Yuehua, a writer using the pseudonym Liu Zhou, quotes 
the Chinese classical philosopher Mencius to underscore the importance to his Muslim audience 
of the reliance of everyone on the nation, for the safety and security of themselves as well as 
their religion (Liu, 1929: 2).
17
   
 In pursuing these two arguments, Hui writers draw on sources ranging from Chinese 
classicism and traditional historiography, to contemporary Egyptian debates over Quranic 
hadith.
18
 Their arguments offer a clearer picture of how the contingent signifier of minzu could 
mark both the distinctive contributions of minority groups—here, the Hui minzu specifically—as 
well as the larger politically-unified whole associated with the Zhonghua minzu.  It is therefore 
not surprising then that for Gu and these Hui colleagues at the Yugong, the means to resolve the 
“Han-Hui question” is not to promote assimilation of Hui into Chinese civilization or to use them 
instrumentally as a means of Han revitalization, but rather to establish institutions that could 
uncover and sustain the distinctive historical contributions Hui have made as simultaneously 
both Muslims and Chinese.  They express shock at the difficulty of doing research or even 
finding information on Hui and Muslim culture in China, given the globally recognized 
resplendence of Islamic thought, contained in classics plentiful enough “to make a pack-ox 
sweat”(Bai, 1937; Gu, 1937a: 180).  Through the establishment of institutions meant to develop 
knowledge about Islam and Chinese Muslims, such as research networks, government-funded 
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religious schools, the professional collection of Muslim books and historical records, and the 
expansion of Islamic libraries, Gu hopes greater knowledge about the Hui will lead to a 
redefinition of national identity.  Central to these efforts is establishing, at all educational levels, 
the study of Hui writing and language (Huihui wenzi yuyan, presumably Arabic) and history as a 
proper form of guowen, or “national literature,” because Hui language and culture are 
legitimately Chinese (Gu, 1937a: 180).  This does not mean that they are to become assimilated 
into Han or “Chinese culture,” or even that their historical contributions to the invigoration of the 
larger “Han minzu” should be emphasized over and above other features of their religious or 
cultural life.  Rather, Gu is explicit that the culture of the Hui is a distinctive yet integral and 
irreducible component of the larger Chinese nation. Some contributors to the symposium take 
these arguments farther, to suggest that recognition of Hui culture as integral to the Zhonghua 
minzu should eventually have influence over national culture. As Xue Wenbo薛文波(1909-1984) 
argues, “Muslim culture (huijiao de wenhua) is not only a kind of rampart of virtue [that protects 
the Hui minzu]; if its religious intentions were to be blended (ronghua) within the hearts of 
people in society, its influence on the nation’s minzu would be truly great” (Xue, 1937: 183). 
This approach sets Gu apart from contemporaries such as Chen Yinke, who attempted to 
write general “cultural histories” which acknowledged transformation of Chinese culture through 
interaction with “foreign” influences but only in terms of the “gradual change of the ‘national 
spirit,’ which nevertheless retains its basic characteristics” (Schneider, 1996: 64). Rather, Gu 
urges a new stage of development and outreach that takes Hui Muslim identity as a central 
component of Chinese identity: 
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According to my own observations among young Muslims I have approached, this new 
stage must include at the very least the following features. (1) It must advance a 
theoretical elucidation of the fundamental doctrines and most important teachings of the 
religion [of Islam]. (2) It must promote the general recognition by both Muslims and non-
Muslims of the historical interactions of Arabic and Chinese culture, as well as various 
facts about the lack of a clear racial (zhongzu) difference between Muslims and non-
Muslims. (3) It must translate and organize all types of Hui-language texts on a large 
scale and in great detail, to offer fresh provocations to the Chinese academic world. (4) It 
must have close contact and deep understanding with the various Muslim countries in 
southwest and central Asia, so that on the basis of cultural relationships they will find 
reasons to protect the border defenses in the western part of our country (Gu, 1937b: 188). 
 
Not only are these measures a good way to develop Islamic religious consciousness among the 
Hui, Gu explains, they are also truly foundational for the establishment of the Zhonghua minzu 
(Gu, 1937b: 188). In speaking of a “new stage” of development for Hui cultural movements, Gu 
promotes a distinctly forward-looking, open-ended vision for the Chinese nation that belies 
claims that he expects their contribution to amount simply to a “melding” or enhancement” of 
existing Han culture.  
This conclusion contradicts that of James Leibold, as well as more recent Chinese 
commentators such as Ma Rong, who argue that the “blending” (ronghe) Gu asserts here and in 
essays such as “The Chinese nation is one” entails the eventual assimilation of all ethnicities and 
races into a unified Chinese nation, akin to the American “melting pot” (Leibold, 2003: 482–
483), or else renders meaningless their political, legal and social practices in the face of existing 
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national institutions (Rong Ma 馬戎, 2012: 5).19 Rather, there is strong evidence to suggest that 
Gu had in mind a much more open-ended and indeterminate vision, which uses the fact of racial 
and cultural “blending” in China’s past to argue for the ongoing interaction of irreducibly diverse 
(but not for that reason necessarily clearly-bounded) groups within the future Chinese nation.  In 
a 1937 speech given to the Muslim Study Society, which in a later postscript he identifies as an 
early iteration of ideas that would be elaborated in greater detail in his essay “The Chinese 
Nation is One,” Gu breaks this more ambitious goal down into three separate tasks (Gu, 2010a: 
64–65).  First, the culture of each nationality (zu) ought to interact with each other, which 
includes spreading the beneficial practices of each culture to other parts of China through sports 
competitions, cuisine, and most importantly simple human interaction. Gu realizes that many 
places in the interior suffer from serious transportation difficulties, so while working to improve 
their infrastructure, interested parties may also collect things for display in museums to at least 
familiarize people in coastal areas with the ways of life of people in the interior and vice-versa 
(Gu, 2010a: 62–3).   
Second, scholars ought to research and write a new-style “general history” (tongshi) that 
collates records from every minzu to build a shared history. The Han-centric nature of most 
current national histories, Gu complains, incites disgust from other minzu groups, leading to 
enmity and resentment rather than the feelings of mutual sympathy required for national unity 
(Gu, 2010a: 63).  On this basis, novels, poems and other popular literature can be produced to 
move people to understand and sympathize with their compatriots in different contexts. 
Otherwise, the persistent mistreatment of the interior regions under Qing and Republican 
regimes will be further transposed to a racial key, in that cultural differences will be interpreted 
as evidence of racial prejudice by the dominant majority (Gu, 2010a: 63–4).  Finally, and 
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perhaps most importantly, Gu urges his young Muslim audience to work toward fostering “a 
forceful public opinion” in the frontier regions, to serve “as the mouthpiece of the people” to 
eliminate their hardships, identify corrupt officials, and advance their education (Gu, 2010a: 64). 
Like the other tasks, this one too was built on the assumption that the work of developing 
education and infrastructure, already begun in the frontier, would be continued and strengthened.   
These tasks, along with those he outlines in response to the “Han-Hui question,” 
mirror —probably deliberately—the kinds of historical interactions that Gu has all along claimed 
to have originally constituted the hybrid Chinese civilization. Rather than see Hui contributing to 
an already-existing entity whose parameters are assumed to be transparent and unchanging, the 
goal of such institution-building efforts and research is to interrogate what it means to be 
Chinese, as a means of inviting both Han and Hui to participate in a co-making of that identity.  
By offering these “tasks” as suggested strategies for an ongoing cultural movement that places 
Hui and non-Han minzu experience at the center (not just the periphery) of the identity of 
Zhonghua minzu, Gu indicates unambiguously that Chinese Muslims, like other minzu, are 
constitutive of China—not only looking backward, but also going forward.   
 
Jiao-affiliation and the Dissolution of “minzu” 
Gu does sometimes explain his project of political unification using the term tonghua, 
often translated into English (and sometimes understood by his contemporaries to mean) 
“assimilation,” giving the impression he does promote the eventual dissolution of minority 
groups into the grander unified Zhonghua minzu.  However, in a lengthy rejoinder to sociologist 
Fei Xiaotong, published in the “Frontier Supplement” of Yishibao, Gu finally offers a decisively 
clear statement of the distinctively political, not cultural or racial, consequences of tonghua. His 
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response to Fei also offers further support for Gu’s introduction of the term jiao, “teachings,” as 
an alternative in some cases for the term minzu. Until that point, Gu had used minzu to refer both 
to the “Chinese nation” and to the “nationalities” that he claimed comprised it, creating some of 
the confusion Fei cites in his letter.   
In that letter, Fei argued that by ascribing a multicultural and plural minzu character to a 
unified Zhonghua minzu, Gu conflates minzu (nation or nationality) with guojia (state or country). 
His thesis, Fei argues, thus amounts to nothing more than saying “The governmental structure of 
the people (renmin) within the borders of China is one,” when really the “minzu question” 
troubles the very congruence of national and state borders that Gu seems to be assuming (Fei, 
2010: 135).  In response, Gu elaborates on how the Zhonghua minzu can be understood as a 
distinctively political association without reducing its coherence to simply the shared adherence 
to specific formal institutions. Rather, its coherence lies in the group affect (tuanjie de qingxu) 
that also constitutes, in his view, the (seemingly necessary and sufficient) condition for the 
definition of a minzu (Gu, 2010c: 125).  This affect is produced through the collective 
accumulation of individual human intention (renmen de yizhi) and as such is importantly and 
distinctively independent of things such as language, history, and culture, which are produced in 
large part by the environment (Gu, 2010c: 126). The tonghua spoken of by Sun Yat-sen, Gu 
argues, cannot possibly mean assimilation into the “Great Han” race, because this kind of 
cultural coherence does not exist even within what are taken to be existing minzu (Gu, 2010c: 
130).
20
   
Gu’s response turns on an alternative view that poses minzu identity not only as a social 
construction but also one in which individuals deliberately gain membership through 
participation in shared ways of life—what Gu calls the minzu’s “teachings.” In Gu’s original 
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essay, “The Chinese Nation is One,” he relates an observation from his time in the northwest the 
previous year.  He notes that when discussing group differences with ordinary laypeople there, 
often they would remark, “We are of the Hui teaching (jiao); you are of the Han teaching; and 
there are people on the steppes who are of the Tibetan teaching.” Gu remarks that  
 
In listening to them, I thought their use of jiao [“teaching”] instead of zu [“people” or 
“nationality”] was an exceedingly interesting thing. So-called “teaching” is a cultural 
classification.21 Because culture is different, there are differences in ways of life, so that 
between them although they are all people of the same country they do not all live in the 
same way—much like there are divisions in occupation, such as the military, politics, 
scholarship, agriculture, industry, and commerce (Gu, 2010d: 100).  
 
Just as all professional occupations are different but equally necessary, so too must different 
kinds of cultural formations exist and flourish within the Chinese nation. And, just as 
occupations—and their membership—can change on the basis of how those members perform 
what are taken to be constitutive functions, so too can Han turn Hui or vice-versa.  In this 
passage, Gu identifies these participatory practices with “culture,” suggesting parallels with 
similar processes that were assumed to function during the imperial era to transform “barbarians” 
into “Chinese” (Sun and Wang, 2013: 136–8). Significantly, however, there remains none of the 
chauvinism that once motivated such claims to cultural transformation. “Jiao” or “teachings” 
here denotes only the “ways of life” different groups of people pursue; in contrast to cognate 
terms such as “Sinicization,” jiao-based transformations do not designate any particular culture 
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as inherently more capable of transforming others or drawing them into its ambit of territorial 
domination.  
As an example of how such a theory, so similar to the culturalist claims assumed by 
Chiang Kai-shek and others, would work absent the presumption of an inherently superior 
culture, Gu offers a further illuminating example. During his travels through Gansu and Qinghai, 
he met two families of descendants of Confucius (designated by the family name Kong). Yet 
these Confucian descendants were not themselves Confucian: one had turned Muslim, and the 
other Tibetan (fanzi).
22
 Did these people flippantly discard the teachings of their ancestor? Gu 
asks. No, they simply responded to the needs of the environment, and having freedom of religion, 
they chose to enter the Hui and Tibetan cultural groups. This proves, Gu argues, that people are 
not rigidly part of certain cultural groups, but ought to follow their interior desires and the needs 
of the external environment to choose an appropriate life (Gu, 2010d: 103). The Zhonghua minzu 
cannot but accommodate such diversity if it is to survive imperialism and embrace the true 
possibilities of its past.   
These views had clear precedents in the discussions of minzu published in the Yugong. 
Already in 1937, the Harvard-educated Qi Sihe marshalled contemporary American 
anthropological and political theory—including that of Harold Laski and Arthur Holcombe—to 
refute the conflation of race, ethnicity and nationality evident in Sun Yat-sen’s principle of minzu. 
Qi argued that neither racial similarity nor lifestyle were adequate for determining a minzu, 
because these changed over time and space, and through interaction (including inter-marriage) 
with others (Qi, 1937: 31–32). The hybrid identities that resulted meant that all racial divides 
were arbitrary and had no scientific value. Therefore, he argues, national unity cannot lie in 
racial background or other “material” conditions, but only in subjective affect (“the sentiment of 
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an esprit de corps,” bicijian paoze de qingxu) (Qi, 1937: 30).  The Hui intellectual Jin Jitang 
similarly concludes that Hui identity, absent other racial, geographic, or even cultural indicators, 
must rest only on the “shared purpose” (gongtong zhi mudi) of living in China and pursuing the 
Muslim teaching (about which he notes there is also disagreement) (Jin, 1936: 29).
23
 
In his response to Fei and in subsequent elaborations, Gu melds these theories to an 
indigenous culturalism, to offer an innovative definition for tonghua: tonghua, Gu conclusively 
asserts, thus amounts to nothing more than “modernization” in historically underprivileged 
frontier areas to alleviate the alienation and vulnerability felt by peoples of China’s frontier 
regions: that is, providing “in general, the skills and knowledge that a modern person ought to 
possess, and the material livelihood that a modern person should enjoy” (Gu, 2010c: 132). At 
that point, it is up to those peoples and individuals what they want to accept, reject, or transform. 
Indeed, Gu argues, their cultures may even encourage Han individuals to “tonghua” into a 
member of the “frontier people” (Gu, 2010c: 132).  
Gu may here have been drawing on arguments developed by his Hui colleagues at the 
Yugong, such as Xue Wenbo and Bai Shouyi, who argued that part of the solution to resolving 
the “Han-Hui question” is recognizing the indeterminacy of the direction of influence between 
Han and Hui.  One reason for studying Islam in China, Bai notes, is that “from the perspective of 
global cultural history (shijie wenhua shi),” Islam does not only absorb elements of other 
cultures, but also can transform them.
24
 These readings of Chinese Muslim history reinforce an 
idea of “culture” as a target of deliberate (re)making in response to different contexts and needs, 
rather than as a given set of practices characteristic of particular ethnic or racial groups. They 
may also explain Gu Jiegang’s insistence on the inclusion of Hui Muslims into Chinese nation-
building: not only were the Hui in possession of a cultural heritage combining both Arabian and 
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Chinese influences, they were staunch exemplars of cultural adaptation and survival, from which 
Han had much to learn. In doing so, he creates unprecedented space in Chinese discourse for 
legitimating the contributions of non-Han minorities to Chinese culture and nation as valuable on 
their own terms, rather than simply via their contributions to a pre-existing Han culture.    
On this reading, Gu cannot possibly mean by tonghua “assimilation” as it is commonly 
meant, i.e., as a form of absorption into a majority group without remainder.  Using Gu’s own 
vocabulary, we might more precisely define tonghua as a shift of jiao-affiliation, in which 
personal commitments to certain groups change over time in a multi-directional and open-ended 
way, resulting in broader changes to culture and practice for both individuals and the groups they 
inhabit. We might say minzus and their members can thus be tonghua’ed into either other minzu 
groups, or into the larger minzu of a (modern) nation-state. These subgroups are themselves 
designated informally by certain practices or jiao but are never clearly bordered (Gu, 2010d: 
102). The Zhonghua minzu for Gu thus stands as a special instance of jiao-affiliation, a site of 
encounter and exchange whose hybrid culture overlaps with but exceeds the affiliations of its 
internal minzu. Specifically, the Zhonghua minzu does not promote a homogenous cultural or 
ethnic identity; its only identity is a political one, emerging from the minimalist demands of what 
Qi Sihe called the “subjective affect” of groupness. On this basis, Gu argues, the term minzu 
should be abandoned as a description of these sub-groups in favor of jiao-affiliation (Gu, 2010d: 
100). Only this shift in conceptual vocabulary will make clear that what binds individuals 
together into larger communities has nothing to do with bloodline descent or race (zhongzu), 
with which minzu as a category has become mistakenly, albeit pervasively, confounded (Gu, 
2010d: 98–99).25 
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The Terms of Being “One” 
Gu’s nationalist project and his activities with Hui activists throughout the 1930s might 
best be understood as an invitation to decenter what contemporary scholars have identified as an 
“ethnicist” model of the nation, in which the nation is seen as “defined by common culture and 
alleged descent” (Townsend, 1992: 103; citing Smith, 1983: 176). Gu argues rather for a view of 
the nation defined by a shared political consciousness, but also suggests specific reforms in 
broad areas of education, research, and culture that may consolidate—but can never legislate in 
advance—a new, broader conceptualization of the Chinese nation and its internally plural culture 
going forward. His project does not, in other words, aspire to be either a coherent and 
comprehensive project of institutional design or a normatively defensible philosophical model 
that would resolve all tensions between jiao-groups and the Zhonghua minzu. He begins with 
more fundamental questions about how the modern Chinese nation, and indeed historical 
Chinese identity itself, might be conceived. For Gu, the Zhonghua minzu is (and should always 
continue to be) an open-ended and emergent, rather than teleologically defined or persistently 
unified, entity.   
Gu’s work in this area has been negatively compared to Will Kymlicka’s vision of 
multiculturalism, defined as the “inalienable right” of different ethnic and political groups to 
peacefully co-exist under a unified political state (Leibold, 2003: 482).
26
  Yet the comparison is 
not as unfavorable to Gu as it may appear. Despite grander claims that “the idea of 
multiculturalism in contemporary political discourse and in political philosophy is about how to 
understand and respond to the challenges associated with cultural and religious diversity,” (Song, 
2017), multicultural challenges to national and political unity are typically phrased as 
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accommodations to non-liberal minority groups, on the basis of those particular principles of 
justice presumably held by the “dominant” liberal national culture.27  Gu would take fundamental 
issue with this way of thinking about the construction of the nation, precisely because his project 
is to challenge rather than reproduce the status quo hierarchies that uphold one group or culture 
as normatively or culturally “dominant” over others.28 To grant “cultural rights” or even 
“recognition” (Taylor, 1992) to these minzu in the fashion of multiculturalism would be to 
further institutionalize their marginalization.  
Gu argues rather that, if China was never as unified, Han-centric, and changeless as 
contemporary nationalists claimed, then the contributions of non-Han peoples must be 
recognized as legitimately part of the Zhonghua minzu. To Gu, this means that such peoples are 
seen as innovative producers of an always-expanding political community shared in common 
with many others, rather than as the “small and weak peoples” predicted by Sun Yat-sen to 
inevitably dissolve into some grander, pre-existing entity called “Chinese culture.” His project 
thus bears closer similarity to—and would benefit—ongoing work by Talal Asad and William 
Connolly, who resist the liberal model of identity and multiculturalism in favor of a de-centered 
plurality in which every group is viewed “as a minority among minorities” (Asad, 2010: 180; 
Connolly, 1996). In speaking of Muslim minorities in another part of the world, Asad argues for 
a radical shift in the constellation of power, away from a model in which a centralized “majority” 
presides over smaller “minorities” toward a formation that attends to how “overlapping patterns 
of territory, authority and time collide with the idea of the imagined national community” (Asad, 
2010: 179; see also Crossley, 1990).  Gu’s work helps us to see how such tensions, which 
inevitably beset the project of national unification, might be marshalled to productively create, 
rather than assume, the identity of the entire nation—by securing the conditions under which 
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“minority” contributions are made constitutive of, and not just supplementary to, the Zhonghua 
minzu.  
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1
 Here, I translate Zhonghua minzu (literally, “people(s) of the Central Florescence”) roughly as I 
expect Gu intended it, as the larger political category into which various cultural and ethnic 
identities (which he also calls minzu) of China might fit. (His dual usage of minzu to mean both 
the larger “nation” and smaller “nationalities” is a practice which continues today in the PRC, by 
commentators such as Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe: see Elliott, 2015: 193). Although such an 
inclusive usage of Zhonghua minzu is often associated with Liang Qichao, who coined the term 
(Leibold, 2007: 10, 32), Julia Schneider argues on the basis of a close textual reading that 
“Zhonghua (minzu) refers by definition  only to the Chinese (Han) people in late imperial texts 
as well as those from the 1920s” (Schneider, 2016: 46, see also 120 et passim).  
2
 “Culturalism” is a term coined by Anglophone historians, starting with Joseph Levenson (1958), 
to describe the Chinese imaginary of an “all-under-Heaven” defined by the normative structures 
of Chinese civilization. For a critical overview of “culturalism” as a concept in English-language 
historiography to describe the “culturally defined community” of pre-modern China, see 
(Townsend, 1992).  It is frequently identified with the claim that Chinese civilization would 
inevitably “Sinicize” non-Chinese peoples (Fairbank, 1968; Schneider, 2017: 52), but because 
variants of this claim are also seen in other civilizations (such as the ‘Sankrit cosmopolis’ 
described by Pollock, 2000), and because Gu here empties these assumptions of their specifically 
Chinese features, I retain the more general-sounding term “culturalism” over the more specific 
“Sinicization” (Hanhua).  
3
 Minzu is, to put it mildly, an incredibly complex concept in modern Chinese. Originally a 
neologism to translate the German word volk, over the past hundred years it has taken on 
collateral nuances derived from the German, English, French and Russian (Soviet) languages of 
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nationalism, ethnicity and peoplehood. Zhou Chuanbin offers a helpful chart of this evolutionary 
process, showing that generally minzu “with Chinese characteristics” can best be translated into 
English as “nation” or “people” (Zhou, 2003: 24). Given that Gu and his colleagues are debating 
the very meaning of minzu, I leave this term untranslated in most of the essay, to avoid 
overdetermining the analytic work done by it. Leaving minzu untranslated in the English name of 
research institutions, scholarly conferences, and journals is also an increasing practice in the 
contemporary PRC.    
4
 Gu’s Zhonghua minzu category, I will show, explicitly rejected claims that China was built 
either on a single culture (wenhua) or a single race (zhongzu). To the extent that homogeneity (or 
claims of homogeneity) along either or both axes are usually implicated with “ethnicity” (see 
Townsend 1992, 109), typically “defined as a sense of common ancestry based on cultural 
attachments, past linguistic heritage, religious affiliations, claimed kinship, or some physical 
traits,” (James, 2017: n.p.) we can infer that Gu would also be against claims to a Chinese 
ethnicity. However, I generally avoid use of this term (except when it is used by secondary 
sources), to prevent conflation of this broader and more diffuse concept with the concepts of 
“race” and “culture” that capture more precisely Gu’s own vocabulary. For a discussion of how 
“ethnicity” is conflated historically with “race,” see Crossley (1990: 2). 
5
 The term “constituencies” is taken from Crossley (2002: 44), who defines them as “the 
constructed audiences to which the multiple imperial personae [of the Qing emperor] addressed 
themselves.” 
6
 Jiaozhi is now part of northern Vietnam. 
7
 Xuantu was the name of one of four Han commanderies established after this area was taken by 
the founding emperor of the Han, Han Wudi: http://baike.baidu.com/view/897811.htm 
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8
 Hon's arguments focus on Gu's commitment to cultural pluralism in the Gushi bian, but do not 
consider how Gu extended or transformed these commitments in his debates with Nationalist 
ideologues in the 1930s. 
9
 In this sense, I agree with recent arguments made by Chan Hok-yin, who shows that contrary to 
the pronouncements of historians such as Yu Yingshi, Gu’s work in the 1930s exhibits 
conceptual continuity with that of his earlier iconoclasm. See Chan, 2016: 194-195. I say more 
about this below.   
10
 This emphasis on political association again distinguishes Gu from someone such as Liu 
Yizheng, who explicitly distinguished the Chinese “nation” as a group separate from, and at 
times in tension with, any given sovereign authorities (Hon, 2004: 523).  
11
 It is not clear, however, if Gu himself wrote this introductory summary, which simplifies the 
more complex issues Gu discusses here.   
12
 That is, because unbinding one’s hair and folding one’s robe a certain way were considered by 
Confucius to be practices of uncivilized “barbarians.” 
13
 Given the extent of his research on the shifting territorial boundaries of historical Chinese 
geography in the Yugong and elsewhere, we can safely assume that for Gu this definition of 
Chinese identity was doubly contingent, subject necessarily not only to changes in political 
authority but also to the transformations of historical, cultural and geographical circumstances 
over time. 
14
 Chan Hok-Yin argues that the continuity in Gu’s work lies in his commitment to explicating 
the plurality of the Chinese past and to finding unity in plurality, and vice-versa (Chan, 2016: 
195.) I agree, but would stress the important political goals such commitments served: here, they 
underwrote Gu’s suport for research on a broadly expanded “Chinese nation.” (For an 
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introduction to the ‘re-organization of the national heritage’ movement, see Eber, 1968; for a 
discussion of Gu’s relationship to that movement, see Jenco, 2017: 463-465). 
15
 Jin explicitly notes the continuity between Gu’s work on Gushibian and his call to attend to 
the records and history of Muslims in China, a project he calls “organizing” (zhengli) Chinese 
Muslim history.  Indeed, such work effectively fulfills the mandates of new “national studies” 
outlined by Hu Shi in his 1921 statement inaugurating the National Studies Journal (Guoxue 
jikan), namely to broaden the scope of research; attend to the systematic organization of the past; 
and broadly seek comparative material (Hu Shi, 1953: 5). For Hu as for Gu, the “national 
heritage” (guogu) was constituted by the “entirety of China’s past culture and history,” not only 
those parts devoid of foreign influence that scholars took to be the ‘national essence” (guocui) 
(Hu 1953, 6). 
16
 The journal was named after the Yugong chapter of the ancient classic the Book of Documents 
that described ancient geography.  Yugong means literally “The Contributions of Yu,” but more 
often is translated as “The Tribute of Yu.” Yu was the ancient sage held to be responsible for 
irrigation and river diversion in early antiquity. One of the journal’s contributors, Qi Sihe, 
identifies “research of the minzu question” as one of the journal’s core concerns (Qi, 1937: 25). 
17
 Pleas to "preserve China's original virtue" are found throughout Yuehua, signaling the close 
relationship between Chinese philosophy and Muslim belief in the eyes of Yuehua's writers and 
readers (e.g., Ma, 1931). 
18
 Matsumoto Masumi's work (2003, 2006) on Chinese Muslim intellectuals documents the 
influence of Middle Eastern, specifically Egyptian, Islamic movements in their writing.  
19
 Part of Ma Rong’s argument for the “depoliticization” of minzu identity, which he links to 
Gu’s arguments in the 1930s, seems to rest on the claim—which Gu would likely deny—that 
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most of the minzu identified in the Ethnic Classification Project of 1954 do not have 
meaningfully distinct forms of political (including legal and economic) institutions or practices 
that would be necessary to incorporate into the larger nation (Ma, 2012: 5). 
20
 He repeats these claims explicitly in the course of responding to critics of the “Chinese Nation 
is One” essay, including the Miao writer Lugefu’er, who objected to the possibility that Han 
might share historical origins with the southern Miao people.  Gu argued that bloodline descent 
was a historical matter, which had little to do with the political consciousness or “shared 
sentiment” that did the real work of unifying the nation (Sun and Wang, 2013: 127–8). 
21
 Before the neologism “religion” (zongjiao) was adopted by modern Chinese from European 
languages, jiao or “teaching” was typically used to designate what might be considered religious 
practices. Ultimately, however, jiao is bound up with cultural as much as religious practices, 
particularly in cases where (as here) the very boundaries between two groups are not clearly 
designated as belonging to one category of difference over another.  This is especially true given 
the ambivalent relationship between Chinese forms of religious practice and the modern category 
of “religion” that itself reflects Protestant Christian pre-occupations and values (see, e.g., Yang, 
2008). 
22
 In the Ming and Qing periods, “Fan” referred to a variety of culturally diverse non-Han ethnic 
groups; however, it is likely Gu is speaking here of the Tibetan peoples of Gansu. For more on 
the ethnonym “Fan,” see Ma (2008: 3, fn. 6). 
23
 Jin does, however, make claims about the identity of the Huizu (that is, the Hui minzu) as 
determined by religion, a line of argument which Gu explicitly rejects (Gu, 2010d: 101) 
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24
 “Islamic culture…has absorbed ancient Greek culture, Persian culture, and Indian culture to 
produce its own distinctive nature. On another, it has repeatedly spread to medieval Europe, 
developing contemporary European civilization” (Bai, 1937: 185). 
25
 Gu here includes the English words “nation” and “race” as translations of minzu and zhongzu, 
respectively. 
26
 Leibold’s presentation of Kymlicka’s idea of multiculturalism overstates its case in at least one 
significant respect: so far as I know, Kymlicka nowhere defends these rights as “inalienable.” 
For Kymlicka and other liberal multiculturalists, such cultural “rights” are posited only insofar as 
there are presumed to exist clearly-defined ethnic groups capable of exercising them for 
predetermined liberal ends—in Kymlicka’s case, autonomy and equality (for a well-known 
critique of Kymlicka on these grounds, see Kukathas, 1992; Kymlicka, 1989, 1996). 
27
 There are, of course, prominent exceptions (Kukathas, 2003; Young, 1990) 
28
 It also goes without saying that Gu would also fundamentally reject the notion (promoted by 
many multiculturalists) that the valid units of analysis are groups defined by “societal cultures” 
that share a single language, culture and history (e.g., Kymlicka, 1989: 135; Taylor, 1992).  
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